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ABSTRACT 
Federal agencies that are within The Department of 
Homeland Security have many missions to support the security 
of the United States.  One mission concurrent with this 
thesis topic is Maritime Interdiction Operations, which 
protects America’s maritime borders from all intrusions by 
halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband 
into the United States through maritime routes.  All 
government agencies within The Department of Homeland 
Security are continuing to focus their effort in sharing 
critical data to improve their situational awareness (SA) of 
command and control (C2), to make quicker decisions, and to 
collaborate with remote experts in support of another 
possible terrorist attack.  Unfortunately this effort is 
being accomplished without the foresight of interoperability 
of existing databases throughout the agencies within The 
Department of Homeland Security. 
 The lack of interoperability of these databases between 
the agencies continues to be a major issue in the security 
and safety to our nation's maritime ports.  This thesis will 
discuss the lack of interoperability of databases between 
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The need 
and urgency to collaborate these vital databases into one 
unified decentralized network—to store and retrieve critical 
information to protect our maritime ports of entry, when 
needed, to protect our nation from any possible future 
threats that may harm our nation—is also stressed. 
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I. EXPLORING INTEROPERABILITY OF DATABASES WITHIN 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AGENCIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since Homeland Security was established in November 
2002, the organization has encountered situations where the 
lack of effective interagency data sharing has resulted in 
failure to intercept attacks and secure our nation.  Over 
the past eight years the President of the United States has 
issued numerous executive orders and memorandums mandating 
that the federal government implement an aggressive effort 
to ensure information sharing between federal, state and 
local agencies. Within these Executive Orders, the President 
is mandating to fully engage in the combined effort to 
embrace interoperability between fellow government agencies.  
The effort has been in full force since the aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attack and the catastrophic event of 
Hurricane Katrina. 
B. CURRENT PROBLEM 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. 
Department of Justice have an ambitious plan to improve 
interagency exchange of intelligence among agencies across 
the United States.  An example of this is the establishment 
of Data Fusion Centers in major urban areas.  The Fusion 
Centers coordinate, gather, analyze, and disseminate law 
enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism 
information among federal, state, and local officials. The 
Data Fusion Centers were created in the aftermath of 
September 11 in an attempt to prevent the intelligence 
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failures that led to the attacks.  Fifty-eight fusion 
centers have been established throughout the United States. 
In support of the effort to implement the information-
sharing environment each of the fifty-eight fusion centers 
use a web-based information sharing application. Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) is the primary means 
for communication, collaboration, situational awareness, 
and information sharing within DHS. 
DHS anxiously deployed HSIN to all fifty states, five 
territories and Washington, D.C to meet the demand of the 
U.S. President’s executive orders and memorandums.  Because 
the initial version of HSIN (developed with Groove) could 
not meet the demand of its large increase of targeted 
audience, DHS decide to migrate HSIN to its web-based cube-
like environments called communities of interest (COI). 
DHS’s main role and objective was to introduce a system that 
would foster interoperability among federal, state, and 
local authorities to enhance counterterrorism throughout the 
United States.  DHS was unable to implement such a system 
due to essential and effective planning.  DHS rushed the 
HSIN schedule, did not clearly define relationships to 
existing systems, developed and deployed HSIN in an ad-hoc 
manner, provided inadequate user guidance and did not 
establish performance metrics (Wagner 2007). 
All over the United States the fusion centers are still 
unable to share information as intended.  The fusion centers 
that utilize HISN are not working as planned because many 
agencies that have access to HSIN act as if they are in the 
cold war state of mind where everyone has to safeguard their 
information.  This leaves a nation that is very reluctant to 
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share information between agencies.   Agencies tend to over 
classify their data, leaving no choice but not to share the 
data.  There is no current incentive to share information 
throughout the agencies; instead you risk the chance of 
being penalized. 
Eight years after 9/11, the inability to share critical 
information seamlessly between agencies still exists.  There 
are many organized groups within the world that are very 
aware of the nations inability to share information and 
secure the maritime ports, terrorists are very aware of this 
unaddressed vulnerability.  Terrorist are preparing in many 
ways to exploit our maritime ports; "Unfortunately, the 
question of whether terrorists will act to exploit the 
weaknesses in port security is, unfortunately, not a matter 
of 'if' they will, but 'when' they will." (Goslin 2008) 
Below are some examples the intelligence community has 
gathered revealing striking information of terrorist 
preparing for an event. 
 
 When captured in November 2002, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 
Al Qaida’s operations chief in the Persian Gulf had 
developed a four-pronged strategy to attack Western-
shipping targets: 
 
 Blowing up medium-sized vessels at ports 
 Attacking vulnerable, large cargo ships such as 
super tankers from the air by using explosive-
laden small aircraft 
 Underwater attacks by divers or suicide 
demolition teams, using limpet mines 
Al-Nashiri was an explosives expert, specializing in 
naval demolition sabotage (Eshel 2005). 
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 At least one Al Qaida operative is known to have been 
in the process of obtaining an international seaman’s 
license that would allow him into any port in the 
world without a visa (Tyler 2002). 
 
 In 2003, 35 heavily armed terrorists boarded a 
chemical tanker off the coast of Sumatra.  However, 
unlike pirates who operate in the region and routinely 
rob the crew and loot the vessel, these boarders 
simply demanded that the ship’s captain teach them how 
to 'drive' the large ship.  Like the 9/11 hijackers, 
who only wanted to learn to fly an airliner, these 
boarders were not interested in learning how to dock 
the vessel (Tyler 2002). 
This thesis will take a look at the background of the 
development of HSIN and problems concerning interagency data 
sharing and its current usage.  This thesis will also 
highlight how Maritime Port Security is at risk due to the 
nation’s inability to share intelligence. The author 
believes Maritime Port Security is a ticking time bomb that 
needs our urgent attention to avoid another unforgettable 
terrorist attack. 
C. STRENGTHING AMERICA 
Listed below is an example of the extensive effort from 
the federal government intensifying its position to improve 
communications, collaboration, and information sharing 
between government and private sector agencies at all levels 
according to the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 
government website. 
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 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 This act was 
passed largely by both the democratic party and the 
republican party which increases the ability of law 
enforcement to search e-mails, telephone, medical and 
financial records. 
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 This act was the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security 
as an executive department of the United States.  The 
primary mission of the department is to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States.  The 
department is to reduce the vulnerability of the 
United States to terrorist attacks while minimizing 
the damage.  The department will also assist in the 
recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur within 
the United States.  The Homeland Security Act also 
states that the department will have a central part in 
improving the sharing of information among federal, 
state, local government agencies and the private 
sector. 
 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (IRTPA) was signed on December 17, 2004 and was 
divided into eight titles; Reform of the intelligence 
community, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Security 
clearances, Transportation, Security, Border 
protection & immigration, Terrorism prevention, 
Implementation of 9/11 Commission recommendations and 
other matters.  This act ensures closer coordination 
of the integration of the 16 agencies that make up the 
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Intelligence Community.  For example, IRTPA requires 
no air travel within the United States or abroad 
without prior government approval. 
 The President issued Executive Order 13356, 
strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to 
Protect Americans, August 27, 2004 that superseded 
Executive Order 13388.  In this executive order, 
President Bush gives the highest priority to prevent 
terrorist attacks against the United States and the 
interchange of information among federal, state and 
local governments. 
Further building on President Bush’s vision to 
strengthen Information sharing among federal, state and 
local authorities, he established the Information Sharing 
Environment agency.  This agency has the overall 
responsibility for implementation of Information sharing 
among the federal government agencies. 
Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, embraced the key principles of 
Executive Order 13356 and directed the establishment of the 
Information Sharing Environment. 
The President was charged to create the ISE, designate 
its organization and management structure, and determine and 
enforce the policies and rules to govern the ISE's content 
and usage. The law further required the ISE be "a 
decentralized, distributed, and coordinated environment" 
that "to the greatest extent practicable, connects existing 
systems; builds upon existing systems capabilities currently 
in use across the government; facilitates the sharing of 
information at and across all levels of security; and 
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incorporates protections for individuals' privacy and civil 
liberties (Information Sharing Environment n.d.). 
On October 25, 2005, the President issued Executive 
Order 13388 revoking Executive Order 13356, Further 
Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to 
Protect Americans, to facilitate the work of the ISE’s 
Program Manager, expedite the establishment of the ISE, and 
restructure the Information Sharing Council. 
On December 16, 2005, in accordance with Section 1016 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, the President issued a Memorandum to Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies prescribing the 
guidelines and requirements in support of the creation and 
implementation of the ISE. The Memorandum contained two 
requirements and five guidelines that prioritize efforts the 
President believes are most critical to the development of 
the ISE and assigned Cabinet officials responsibility for 
resolving some of the more complicated issues associated 
with information sharing among federal, state and local 
authorities. 
The President directed that the ISE be established by 
building upon "existing Federal Government policies, 
standards, procedures, programs, systems, and architectures 
(collectively "resources") used for the sharing and 
integration of and access to terrorism-related information, 
and leverage those resources to the maximum extent 
practicable, with the objective of establishing a 
decentralized, comprehensive, and coordinated environment 
for the sharing and integration of such information 
(Information Sharing Environment n.d.). 
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D. BACKGROUND OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The United States Department of Homeland Security was 
established on November 25, 2002, by the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 following the aftermath terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. The creation of DHS constitutes the 
biggest reorganization of U.S. government in American 
history and the most substantial reorganization of federal 
government agencies in the fifty years since the United 
States Department of Defense was created. DHS also 
constitutes the most diverse merger of federal functions and 
responsibilities, incorporating 16 department components 
into a single organization. The following is a listing of 
major agencies that are now within Department of Homeland 
Security. 
 The Directorate for National Protection and Programs 
Serves the public by providing knowledge, skills, and 
equipment to help secure the National critical 
infrastructure assets. The agency is able to assist in 
providing a risk-based approach that takes into account 
all hazards, threats, vulnerabilities, critically, 
consequences, and available mitigation strategies. 
 The Directorate for Science and Technology is the primary 
research and development arm of the Department.  It 
provides federal, state and local officials with the 
technology and capabilities to protect the homeland. 
 The Directorate for Management The Directorate of Science 
and Technology is the primary organization for research 
and development in the Department of Homeland Security. 
The directorate consists primarily of six divisions:  
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Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, 
and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; 
Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors.  
Additional offices have responsibilities, such as 
laboratory facilities and university programs that cut 
across the divisions. 
 The Office of Policy strengths the security by developing 
and integrating department-wide policies in order to 
coordinate the departments prevention, protection, 
response and recovery missions.  The Office of Policy 
bridges multiple headquarter components and operating 
agencies to improve communication among DHS entities. 
 The Office of Health Affairs serves as the principal 
agent for all medical health matters for the Department 
of Homeland Security.  The Office of Health Affairs role 
is to develop and support an intelligence-based bio-
defense and health preparedness architecture to ensure 
the security of our Nation in the face of all hazards. 
 The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has the 
responsibility of gathering information, assessing data 
and disseminating to the appropriate agencies.  This 
data is used to protect the territory of the United 
States from terrorist attacks and responding to natural 
disasters. 
 The Office of Operations Coordination has the 
responsibility for monitoring the security of the United 
States and coordinating activities that would prevent, 
protect, and respond from terrorist threats and man-made 
disasters. The office is focused on information sharing 
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through their National Operations Center (NOC) to deter, 
detect, and prevent terrorist attacks.  The NOC uses a 
database named Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN). 
 The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides 
training opportunities to state, local, and campus and 
tribal law enforcement officers at low or no cost, which 
will enhance their ability to enforce new methods while 
staying safe. 
 The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s main objective 
is to detect and report any unauthorized attempts to 
import, posse or transport any radiological material 
within the United States. 
 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
oversees the security for the highways, railroads, 
buses, mass transit system, ports and the airports.  
Their main focus is that these areas are safe for 
travel. 
 United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) main 
mission is to prevent terrorist from entering the United 
States while regulating and facilitating international 
trade, collecting duties and enforcing U.S. Trade Laws. 
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
oversees the immigration to the United States, which 
establishes policies and procedures. 
 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
targets criminal networks and terrorist organizations 
that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in our immigration 
system. 
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 The United States Coast Guard is involved in maritime 
law enforcement, mariner assistance, search and rescue, 
marine inspections of U.S. /Foreign vessels entering the 
United States.  The main mission is to protect the 
public, the environment, and the United States economic 
and security interests in America’s ports, waterways and 
international waters. 
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has the 
responsibility to reduce the loss of life and property 
from natural disasters, acts of terrorism and man-made 
disasters. 
 The United States Secret Service protects the President 
and other high-level officials and investigates 
counterfeiting and other financial crimes, including 
financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer 
fraud; and computer-based attacks on our nation’s 
financial, banking, and telecommunications 
infrastructure. (Department of Homeland Security, n.d.) 
 
As these agencies were merged into the Department of 
Homeland Security, each agency had their own independent 
database that was not designed to share information 
seamlessly with others.  With the creation of the Department 
of Homeland Security, they were tasked with the 
responsibility of creating an interagency information-
sharing environment to combat terrorism within the United 
States.  This information-sharing environment will be 
designed to assist federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies in identifying possible threats against the United 
States by using existing data collect by all agencies.  This 
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thesis will highlight how this information-sharing 
environment is linked to the security of our maritime ports 
of entry. 
 
Figure 1 Department of Homeland Security Agencies. 
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II. DATABASES WITHIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
A. DHS PRIMARY INFORMATION SHARING NETWORK 
1. Description of System Database (HSIN) 
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was 
first created as an extension of the Joint Regional 
Information Exchange System (JRIES), which started in 2002 
as a pilot system to connect the California Anti-Terrorism 
Information Center, the New York Police Department, and the 
Department of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  This pilot 
system was designed to exchange real time intelligence and 
law enforcement data between the departments and assist in 
the detection of any possible terrorist activities in a 
secure environment.  On September 2003, the DIA transferred 
ownership of the program due to funding constraints to the 
DHS. Upon receiving the program, DHS realized that they 
could vastly expand the current program beyond its current 
use to include the integration and interoperability of 
information sharing throughout federal, state, local, tribal 
authorities to prevent terrorism as undertaking incident 
management activities.  To reflect the program’s new scope 
of interest and abilities the department decided the program 
should be renamed to Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN). 
The Office of Operations Coordination has the 
responsibility for monitoring the security of the United 
States and coordinating activities that would prevent, 
protect, and respond from terrorist threats and man-made 
 14
disasters. The office is focused on information sharing 
through their National Operations Center (NOC) to deter, 
detect, and prevent terrorist attacks.  The NOC furthered 
the development of HSIN and designed the program to allow 
federal, state, local and tribal authorities to voluntarily 
add information for sharing to HSIN as needed, meaning no 
authority actually has a mandated requirement to submit 





Figure 2 Log on Screen into HSIN. 
 
To be able to voluntarily share information with 
relevant authorities the NOC established different COIs 
within the HSIN network.  They include; HSIN National 
Operations Center (NOC), HSIN Law Enforcement (LE), HSIN 
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Government, HSIN Emergency Management (EM), HSIN Information 
Analysis (IA), HSIN National Capitol Region (NCR), HSIN 




Figure 3 Homeland Security Information Network. 
 
The HSIN COIs are collaborative cube-like environments 
where users within the same subject matter area or industry 
may voluntarily post and view information from others (if 
any added).  The cube-like environment functions like a chat 
room where threads are posted and users post replies within 
that thread.  The environment has other tools such as 
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instant chat to discuss with other users.  However, each 
individual COI decides whether to enable these tools. 
To gain access to this cube-like environment an 
individual must submit their biographical information and 
employment information. Once the individual is verified, the 
user is given access to his/her respective COI, i.e., law 
enforcement, emergency management; however, an individual 
may be a member of more than one COI if criteria are met. 
DHS is not responsible or the custodian for the 
monitoring of information found within HSIN.  However, DHS 
provides the communication tool for users to voluntarily add 
information for sharing as needed. (Operations Directorate 
National Operations Center 2007) 
Also, the Department of Homeland Security reported to 
Congress in February 2008 that DHS has spent approximately 
$69 million on HSIN over the past five years.  The 
department has additionally report to Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and annual cost of $21 million for the HSIN 
program for budget year 2008. DHS has halted further 
improvements on the existing HSIN system in September 2007. 
Since then, the department has only continued to operate and 
maintain the system. (Department of Homeland Security 2008) 
2. System Capabilities 
The Homeland Security Information Network is a 
computer-based counterterrorism communications system 
connecting all fifty states, five territories, Washington, 
D.C and fifty major urban areas.  HSIN is Department of 
Homeland Security secure, Sensitive-but-unclassified (SBU), 
web-based communications database that provides the primary 
 17
means of connectivity between the Homeland Security 
Operations Center (HSOC), the fifty-eight fusions centers 
throughout the United States along with federal, state, and 
local authorities. 
HSIN is able to offer real time chat and instant 
messaging capabilities, as well as a document library that 
contains reports from multiple federal, state, and local 
sources.  The system supplies suspicious incident and pre-
incident information, mapping and imagery tools, 24/7 
situational awareness, and analysis of terrorist threats, 





Figure 4 Homeland Security Fusion Center Locations 
3. System Problems and Limitations 
Upon acquiring the system from the DIA in 2003, DHS was 
under pressure to expand the system to all federal, state 
and local authorities.  With high concerns of possible 
future terrorist attacks, HSIN’s strategy was to deploy the 
system to all federal, state and local authorities as it was 
and deal with the problems at a later date. The pressure DHS 
was receiving to implement a product created an atmosphere 
that did not produce a quality product for anyone to use 
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effectively (Deffer 2006).  During DHS’s hurried 
implementation, their delivery of the system overlooked the 
use and collaboration with comparable law enforcement 
systems such as, Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and the 
Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET) 
resulted in duplication of data and opportunities for 
sharing (Deffer 2006.) Many law enforcement agencies still 
today use LEO and RISSNET over HSIN because of their ability 
to share information more efficiently, the one thing that 
HSIN was to replace.  Also, DHS developed the Communities of 
Interest cube-like environment that only let communities of 
the same nature share information [National Operations 
Center (NOC), Law Enforcement (LE), Government, Emergency 
Management (EM), Information Analysis (IA), National 
Capitol Region (NCR), International, Critical Sector (CS)] 
leaving an environment that is not fostering the whole 
concept of interoperable information sharing among federal, 
state, and local authorities.  Furthermore, DHS did not 
conduct a complete technical evaluation of HSIN before their 
implementation.  There was inadequate user guidance, 
training, and reference materials discussing how and what 
should be shared among their communities of interest.  This 
resulted in federal, state, and local authorities defining 
their own information sharing process, which increased 
duplication and lack of standardization. 
Another concern is that DHS is not developing adequate 
performance measures.  DHS measures it’s performance based 
on active user accounts throughout the federal, state, and 
local authorities.  This is a poor measurement of how many 
individuals actually use HSIN on a daily basis to share 
information. HSIN has approximately 18,000 registered users 
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which only 6 percent contribute daily to the network’s three 
major portals: law enforcement, emergency management, and 
counter terrorism; therefore HSIN has only about 1,100 
active users. (Department of Homeland Security, OIG-06-38, 
2006) 
Due to HSIN’s inability to link with other databases, 
such as LEO and RISSNET, and share information with other 
communities of interest, many users convey a large 
dissatisfaction of the functionalities that HSIN was 
supposed to address and fix. (Deffer 2006) At this point, 
many users do not understand HSIN’s role in information 
sharing and do not trust the system’s capabilities to meet 
their needs.  Many users still use LEO and RISSNET to 
conduct their day-to-day business and share information with 
other federal, state, and local authorities.  Some agencies 
have given up on HSIN and started developing their own ad-
hoc stove-piped information sharing system that HSIN was 
intended to correct. (Deffer 2006) 
With the development of alternative information sharing 
systems, users are making limited use of HSIN.  Even though 
law enforcement is the principle customer, officials at 
fusion centers and counterterrorism units have said that 
they do not use HSIN to share information on a regular basis 
or do not log on at all to share information. (Deffer 2006) 
4. Redesigning System Database to HSIN NextGen 
In February 2008, DHS announced to its user (federal, 
state, and local authorities) that HSIN was going be 
upgraded to meet their suggested needs.  The upgrade was 
named NextGen, which started its initial phase into the 
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authorities in May 2008.  DHS has stated that this upgrade 
of HSIN to NextGen is to significantly increase information 
sharing among the authorities. DHS decided to upgrade the 
existing HSIN because the existing system had security 
concerns and information sharing throughout the between 
agencies were not being accomplished.  Also, with the first 
version of HSIN, DHS has a key initiative to reduce the 
number of systems within DHS that share sensitive but 
unclassified information. 
Along with the announcement of NextGen, DHS developed 
an acquisition strategy where the system will be implemented 
in four phases with additional users increasing with each 
phase.  DHS will start to transition its current users of 
HSIN to NextGen in May 2009.  DHS has awarded the contract 
to General Dynamics One Source, LLC of Fairfax, VA that will 
develop, deploy, operate and maintain the new system.  The 
initial award will be for $19 million and the total 
potential value if all four options are exercised is $62 
million. DHS will continue to use HSIN with a goal of 
retirement in September 2009 when HSIN NextGen is expected 
to be completed. DHS estimates it has spent a total of $91 
million on the current HSIN through fiscal 2008. Also, to 
continue to operate HSIN until September 2009, DHS has 
estimated that it will spend an additional 3.1 million. 
[From the learning curve of the existing version of HSIN], 
DHS still is in the process of identifying sound controls 
such as project and acquisition planning, requirements 
development and management and risk management to fully and 
effectively manage HSIN NextGen in a closely controlled 
manner.  DHS plans to address these weaknesses by tasking  
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the contractor to assist in the development and completion 
in the risk management area. (Department of Homeland 
Security, OIG-09-07, 2008) 
Until these weaknesses are effectively addressed 
and DHS implements and institutionalizes the full 
set of acquisition management controls, the 
project will be at increased risk of operating in 
an ad hoc and chaotic manner—potentially 
resulting in increased project costs, delayed 
schedules, and performance shortfalls. 




III. MARITIME INTERDICTION—ARE OUR PORTS SECURED? 
A. THE USE OF HOMELAND SECURITY DATABASES TO SUPPORT 
MARITIME PORT SECURITY 
The nation we live in is ever changing and the 
conventional thinking has failed to adapt to a world of new 
threats.  Today we live in a technology enriched environment 
where we are able to stay connected and get the information 
we are requesting with the touch of a button. So the 
question has to be asked, “why doesn't the United States 
have a functional database to combat terrorism”? Even after 
the Government Accounting Office, The Department of Homeland 
Security Inspector General and a Congressional Research 
Service for Congress have all stated in several reports that 
the agency has been unable to create a fully functional 
interoperable network that can be used by all agencies to 
strengthen the nations ability to combat terrorism, nothing 
improves. These reports also provided strong recommendations 
for attending to their oversight.  Here we are eight years 
later and we still do not have what we need to keep America 
safe.  Maritime Ports throughout America are ticking time 
bombs that are just beginning to be addressed.  One major 
contributor to the success of protecting our Maritime ports 
is the ability to share intelligence seamlessly with other 
federal, state and local agencies.   There are several 
databases currently in use around DHS agencies that address 
Maritime Port Security. CBP has a database named ACE and 
PRIDE while the Coast Guard has MISSLE and the newly 
constructed WATCHKEEPER.  All these databases contain 
intelligence on incoming vessels, containers, and the 
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Maritime Port Security agreements with the local ports 
throughout the nation.  Moreover, all these databases are 
completely independent of each other with no way to share 
critical intelligence if needed in support of another 
terrorist attack. 
Many of the efforts to protect our maritime ports are 
duplicated by multiple agencies while wasting resources and 
time that could be better utilized.  For example, CBP will 
attend to a foreign vessel calling on a U.S. port to conduct 
an inspection and validate the individuals on board or to 
check the validity of the claimed cargo on board the vessel.  
As CBP is leaving the vessel with their collected 
information, the Coast Guard is boarding the vessel to 
obtain the same information that CBP just ascertained.  The 
inefficiency of not having an interoperable intelligence-
sharing network is completely unacceptable in the era we 
live.  The Maritime Port Security is at the hands of the 
Department of Homeland Security, which has a responsibility 
to safe guard America and provide an intelligence-sharing 
platform. 
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B. THE CURRENT STATE OF PORT SECURITY WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Figure 5 Example of container ship entering U.S. port. 
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 on the 
United States has heightened the security of all elements 
not excluding Maritime Port Security. With 70 percent of the 
planet covered with water, ships carry approximately 80 
percent of the world trade by volume. (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2002) The United States 
has 361 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline.  While the 
United States leads the world as the leading trading nation, 
accounting for nearly 20 percent of the annual world ocean-
borne overseas trade.  The 6 million cargo vessels that 
enter the United States account for 25 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Frittelli 2005). 
On November 25, 2002, congress established a new port 
security framework named the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA). The MTSA is the United States version 
of the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code 
issued from the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  
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MTSA was developed to aide in the protection of the nations 
ports and waterways.  Within the MTSA there were a series of 
security improvements in the ability to conduct assessments 
of port facilities and vessels; the ability to identify risk 
associated with ports and be able to write security plans 
that reflect these concerns; the development of the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) which 
is a controlled access secure biometric ID card for port 
works to access identified restricted area’s; also an 
evaluation of foreign ports from which United States bound 
vessels may depart. 
Another step forward in the nation’s security was the 
creation of the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) 
Port Act 2006.  The SAFE placed new procedures and amended a 
few MTSA regulations while increasing maritime security.  
The SAFE act developed a comprehensive timetable and set fee 
restrictions for the TWIC; also the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) which will process and examine containers 
that are loaded at foreign ports before they enter the 
United States. 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Bureau of 
Customs of Border Protection (CBP) are the primary 
departments within the Department of Homeland Security that 
have the ultimate responsibility for securing our Nations 
Ports. 
The Coast Guard is the nations premier maritime law 
enforcement authority, which recently under the MTSA act was 
empowered with the nations port security issues.  The Coast 
Guard has a vast amount of responsibility in intercepting 
terrorist threats associated with foreign vessels aimed at 
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our U.S. ports.  To foster this initiative, the Coast Guard 
sought to improve the overall quality of information that 
was being supplied by foreign vessels entering the United 
States.  The Coast Guard instituted new reporting 
requirements for vessels entering and departing the United 
States under the former 24-hour advanced Notice of Arrival 
(NOA).  The new requirements under the Advanced Notice of 
Arrival (ANOA) require vessels entering the United States to 
enter complete information on the vessels crewmembers, 
passengers, cargo and general characteristics of the vessel 
(i.e. IMO ship identification number, ISPS security plan 
completed) 96 hours before entering the United States.  The 
Coast Guards National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) receives 
all ANOA and processes all submissions.  Each Captain of the 
Port (COTP), however, has the ultimate responsibly for 
ensuring each ANOA is complete for vessels entering their 
specific port of entry.  The Coast Guard has issued numerous 
COTP orders denying the entry of foreign vessels into the 
United States because the vessel did not give their 96 ANOA 
or had incomplete vessel data. 
Custom and Border Protection main mission is to prevent 
terrorist from entering the United States while regulating 
and facilitating international trade, collecting duties and 
enforcing U.S. Trade laws.  CBP working along side the U.S. 
Coast have their own vast amount of duties and 
responsibilities to protect our ports.  CBP’s Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) is an amazing effort to deter 
terrorist activity against the United States by allowing CBP 
agents to screen containers at foreign ports before the 
containers enter a U.S. waters.  Along with this effort CBP 
increase their reporting of required information to be 
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submitted to the agency 24 hours before the cargo is to be 
loaded from a foreign port that is U.S. bound.  Before the 
increase in submitting the required information the foreign 
vessel did not have to declare what they were carrying until 
they reached a port within the United States.  CBP will not 
longer accept general terms such as general cargo for entry 
into the United States.  Foreign vessels bound for the 
United States now have to specifically identify what 
chemicals or certain dangerous cargo may be present on the 
vessel.  This enables CBP to focus more of their energy on 
high interest vessels coming into our ports that could be 
carrying nuclear radiological chemicals (Frittelli 2005). 
C. MEGA-PORT INITIATIVE AND NUCLEAR RADIATION DETECTION 
The world's largest and busiest ports are considered 
Mega-ports, which provide terrorist a global shipping 
network for possible smuggling of radiological material. The 
purpose of the Mega-port initiative is to screen containers 
regardless of their destination, for nuclear and other 
radioactive material that could be used against the United 
States or its allies such as a dirty bomb1.  The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that between 
1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illegal 
trafficking of radiological materials worldwide. 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004) Many of these 
materials that were found could have been used to make a 
                     
1 A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive device with radioactive 
material wrapped around it. Detonating the device disperses the 
radioactive material, contaminating the area with radioactivity that can 
be difficult to clean.  Dirty bombs are also know as radiological 
dispersion devices, CRS Report for Congress, Port and Maritime Security: 
Background and Issues for Congress, updated May 10, 2005 by John F. 
Frittelli.  
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nuclear weapon of a dirty bomb.  The inability to identify 
and prevent the entry of any radiological material into the 
United States could have devastating consequences to the 
nations economic stability. The federal government has 
adapted a recommendation from 9/11 Commissions Act that will 
require 100 percent screening of all United States bound 
containers from foreign ports for radiological material 
using nuclear radiation detection by 2012. 
Through the Mega-ports initiative the Department of 
Energy (DOE) is working with foreign governments to provide 
the Mega-ports with the nuclear radiation detection.  
Currently there are 75 ports, which are identified as a 
Mega-port initiative. According to the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) "since the start of the Mega-
ports Initiative in fiscal year 2003, NNSA has completed 
installations at 19 ports in various countries: Bahamas, 
Belgium, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Greece, Honduras 
(Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) Port), Israel (Pilot 
Project), the Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan (SFI Port), 
Panama, the Philippines, Spain, Singapore, South Korea (SFI 
Port), Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United Kingdom (SFI 
Port). Implementation is underway at additional ports in 
more than 20 other locations, including: Bangladesh, 
Belgium, China, Djibouti, Dubai–United Arab Emirate, Egypt, 
Hong Kong, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, 
Panama, Portugal, Spain, and Taiwan" with latest addition of 
Israel's Haifa Port, one of Israel's busiest seaports." 
The Mega-port initiative and nuclear radiation 
detection is a giant step in the right direction of maritime 
port security. However, it is still unclear how the data 
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will be maintained or shared throughout Department of 
Homeland Security interagency.  The federal government has 
many ongoing efforts to increase maritime port security of 
the nation but continues to lack a sustainable information-
sharing interagency environment (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2007). 
D. INFORMATION SHARING CRITICAL FOR MARITIME PORT 
SECURITY 
The initiatives that are being taken by U.S. Coast 
Guard and Customs and Border Protection are important steps 
in building an effective foundation that will support 
maritime port security. However these initiatives alone are 
not fulfilling the nations deserving security (Frittelli 
2005). 
Information sharing among federal, state, local, 
tribal, private sector commercial, and other non-
governmental stakeholders involved in identifying and 
preventing terrorism to the United States is supposed to be 
one of Department of Homeland Security's main objectives.  
Maritime port security has increased since 9/11, but we 
still have large vulnerabilities relating to our inability 
to share critical information that could potentially secure 
our maritime ports.  Since our attack on the United States 
we have rushed to secure our nation by developing 
information sharing networks that are no more useful today 
than they were eight years ago. The Department of Homeland 
Security was under such pressure to develop an information-
sharing network immediately following 9/11 that the agency 
introduced HSIN. The system was introduced in such a rush 
that the agency was going to address operational problems 
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and details at a later date. The Departments of Homeland 
Security's HSIN network was introduced in 2003 and the 
agency has spent around 91 million dollars of federal monies 
to develop a network only 6 percent of its registered users 
find useful.  Information sharing is the very foundation 
that is needed to secure our maritime ports.  In maritime 
port security there are many different law enforcement 
agencies that have responsibilities contributing to the 
overall success of the detection and prevention of another 
terrorist attack on the United States.  However, information 
sharing is at a bare minimum because we the government have 
been unable to develop an effective inter-linking network 
that is well accepted and used by all federal agencies to 
combat terrorism. Agencies all over the United States are 
duplicating their work efforts by not sharing critical 
information. Duplication of work and not sharing any data 
collected is where we were when 9/11 happened and we're 
still in the same situation.  Duplication of effort by our 
federal agencies not only hampers our efforts to effective 
information sharing, but also hampers our efforts to secure 
our maritime ports form future terrorist activity and attack 
according to a testimony by Captain William Harris on 
Homeland Security Information Network to the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
Intelligence is the key element when detecting 
terrorist activity within a maritime domain.  Being able to 
pin point exactly what vessel to intercept is going to 
require identifying precise intelligence.  The only way the 
government is going to achieve this level of cohesiveness is 
to leave behind the idea of safe guarding information and 
enter the new era of sharing intelligence between agencies. 
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Currently, information sharing throughout the federal 
government still entertains the idea of disparate databases 
to secure our maritime ports. 
For example, information such as last port of call, 
crew list and cargo are not currently being shared between 
CBP, USCG, ICE, etc.  Each agency requires the foreign 
vessel to submit their information on specific forms.  The 
process of vetting a vessel takes time, something that is 
not always available when dealing with terrorist activities.  
Information sharing between agencies is so vital in 
detecting future threats to our maritime ports of interest.  
The United States receives thousands of foreign vessels 
daily that have to be verified before entry. If we were able 
to collaborate information collected from each agency, we 
would have a higher probability of terrorist detection. 
 
 33
IV.  CONNECTING THE DOTS 
A. CREATING A COMMON OPERATING PICTURE 
The ultimate goal in protecting our Maritime ports is 
the ability to share intelligent information between 
agencies that will enable a common operating picture (COP).  
The COP is a single identical display that is used by more 
than one decision authority to facilitate collaborative 
planning with an end result of decision superiority. If 
agencies are not using a COP they run the chance of 
miscommunication because they have different pictures, ideas 
and perspective of an event.  The common operating picture 
is a virtual operating environment that promotes information 
sharing throughout federal, state, and local law enforcement 
authorities by giving each agency access to the information 
they need visually to effectively protect Maritime ports of 
entry.  
Agencies throughout the Department of Homeland Security 
have different responsibilities that relate to protecting 
the security of our maritime ports.  This includes Custom 
and Border Protection, United States Coast Guard, local 
police and fire departments to name a few. These separate 
agencies have tendencies not to communicate as often as they 
should which result with inconsistent systems supporting the 
processes of safeguarding maritime ports.  An interoperable 
COP will allow multiple agencies to share information, while 
creating greater operational effectiveness in protecting our 
maritime ports.  Also, by creating a COP, it reduces costs 
that would often result from maintaining disparate systems 
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across all agencies. The creation of a COP must ensure the 
environment is interoperable with the tools and process that 
these agencies are custom to using.  Most of the time COP's 
are developed with the vision of only military or federal in 
mind with no consideration of our first responders.  So we 
must ensure that our COP incorporates interoperability 
functionality to support both federal and first responders 
to be successful. 
Once the COP is developed there are system privileges 
that can be set to allow access to specific user 
requirements.  Being able to adjust the level of permissions 
an individual will have access to makes the COP scalable and 
secure.  For example, the United States Coast Guard has 
information on vessels arriving into New York, however the 
fire department in San Diego, CA does not need this 
information to prevent/respond to and maritime port incident 
the Sand Diego area.  So the COP is designed to limit access 
to some data to protect privacy and some military 
information may require a security clearance. 
While we are in the process of creating an environment 
that accepts information sharing instead of safeguarding 
valuable information, technical solutions already exist and 
are waiting.  Additionally, presidential memorandums are in 
place to support and enable interoperability.  We are at a 
place in time now to embrace and move forward, and we can do 
this by eliminating our disparate systems and get on the 
same page by using a common operating system that will 
enhance the protection of or Maritime ports. (Pellicci n.d.) 
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B. CREATING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TO ENHANCE MARITIME 
PORT SECURITY 
Now that we are on the path to interoperability and 
sharing information, we must have situational awareness 
(SA).  Situational awareness is the process of knowing what 
is going on around oneself and being able to interpret what 
is important to the task at hand. There are three distinct 
levels of awareness: perception (level 1), comprehension 
(level 2) and projection (level 3) (Endsley et al. 2006, 
634). With the movement through the machine age, the 
computer age and now the information age we have created 
tools that are no longer simple; we've moved into a complex 
information world.  The systems today are capable of 
producing vast amount of information, both from internal and 
external environments.  This is an amazing achievement to be 
able to locate, track and identify vessels entering any port 
in the United States.  However, the problem is not the lack 
of information but finding what is needed when it is needed. 
There is a huge gap between the amounts of data being 
produced and disseminated and people's ability to find the 
key piece of information needed to maintain the security of 




Figure 6 The Information Gap Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Situation Awareness: Critical Review by Mica R. Endsley 
For example, information sharing between agencies is so 
important to success in fighting terrorism in the United 
States.  However, there is a point where sharing too much 
information could be detrimental to your operational 
success.  Have you ever received information that you 
requested and decided that it was just too much for what you 
needed? so you did not read anything at all.  There is a 
concept that was developed by Dr. Hayes-Roth called Valuable 
Information at the right Time (VIRT).  Information sharing 
has to be organized, managed and disseminated in a matter 
that individuals are not overwhelmed. 
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A general definition of SA that has been found 
acceptable across platforms describes SA as "the perception 
of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of the meaning and the 
projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley et 
al. 2000). This definition helps establish what "knowing 
what is going on" entails. 
 
Figure 7  Diagram of the Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Situation Awareness: Critical Review by Mica R. Endsley 
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 Perception Level 1 - "The perception of relevant 
information from the environment forms the first 
level of SA.  Without basic perception of 
important information (through visual, auditory, 
tactile, or other means), the odds of forming an 
incorrect picture of the situation increase 
dramatically.  In highly complex and demanding 
environments, novices may have significant 
difficultly in knowing which information is most 
important or in accessing needed information is 
a timely matter to form level 1 SA". 
 Comprehension Level 2 - "Situation awareness 
involves more than simple perception of 
information - it also demands that people 
understand the meaning and significance of what 
they have perceived [Level 2 SA].  Thus it 
encompasses how people combine, interpret, 
store, and retain information, integrating 
multiple pieces of information and arriving at a 
determination of its relevance to the person's 
goals.  This analogous to having a high reading 
comprehension, as compared to just reading 
words". 
 Projection Level 3 - "At the highest level of 
SA, the ability to forecast future situation 
events and dynamics [level 3 SA] marks 
individuals who have the highest level of 
understanding of the situation.  This ability to 
protect from current events and dynamics to 
anticipate future events (and their 
implications) allows for timely decisions 
making.  Experts rely heavily on future 
projections as hallmarks of skilled 
performance." (Endsley et al. 2006) 
The SA model above represents how SA develops over time 
considering decision-making and performance.  There are 
important enabling attributes within an environment that 
affect how people are able to obtain and maintain 
Situational awareness.  These attributes include system  
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capability, design of system, system complexity, system 
automation and stress/workload because both of these 
decrease SA. 
SA is an important key to enhancing Maritime Security 
throughout the United States. We must understand the 
interoperable systems we produce do not provide the SA nor 
do they create any need for SA in and of themselves, humans 
are the key to perception and decision-making. 
For example, HSIN is an environment that was 
established for centralized information sharing. In this 
environment federal, state, and local authorities have the 
capability to freely added information if desired.  CBP may 
discover that an incoming foreign vessel from South Africa 
has a high interest crewmember on board and decide not to 
share within HSIN, (since there is no mandate you have to 
share).  By not sharing this critical information you are 
limiting the SA of the Coast Guard, ICE and local law 
enforcement authorities. Not sharing information weakens the 
decision makers ability to formulate a perception of acting 
on the information or not. 
C. CHANGING POLICIES 
Currently the United States Government is constructed 
to win wars of the past by safe guarding their information 
and not sharing with other agencies. To be successful in 
preventing future terrorist attacks greatly depends on our 
ability to gather, analyze and share intelligence within 
federal agencies.  
For the past eight years, the federal administration 
has set forth numerous changing policies to enhance and 
 40
mandate interoperability among federal, state, local and 
tribal agencies throughout the United States. The USA 
Patriot Act of 2001 and Presidential Executive Order 13356 
are just a few examples that represent an effort to set 
information sharing standards and to enhance the overall 
security of our nation.  Setting and changing policies is 
the first step towards creating a stronger informed nation.  
However, many of these policies are so radical to past 
beliefs of protecting information that after eight years of 
policy setting, we still do not have a framework fully 
capable of information sharing among all federal agencies.  
During the past eight years the federal government has made 
progress towards the goal of interoperability and sharing 
intelligence to combat terrorism, however, too many years 
have past with little success. The American people deserve 
more from their tax paying dollars that goes into developing 
interoperable software.            
The federal government created the Department of 
Homeland Security in the aftermath of 9/11 to secure our 
nation and preserve our freedom.  The agency also has the 
responsibility of creating an interoperable environment 
where vital data can be shared.  In this thesis, I decided 
to highlight and examine the Department of Homeland 
Security's information sharing platform named HSIN.  As 
mentioned earlier in this thesis, the development of HSIN 
has encountered many difficulties implementing the new 
policies to share information.  The Department of Homeland 
Security is not the only federal agency having difficulties 
adjusting to policy change.  The rush to establish an 
interoperable sharing environment is present throughout the  
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federal, state, and local governments. Just recently 
President Obama issued a new Presidential memorandum 
stating: 
The government should not keep information 
confidential merely because public officials 
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because 
errors and failures might be revealed, or because 
of speculative or abstract fears. In the face of 
doubt, openness prevails. 
We are still in the process of accepting these needed 
changes set forth by the presidential memorandums.  Maybe 
just setting a policy is not the answer to prepare us for 
another terrorist attack; maybe we need to change our mental 
thought of a "need to know" era to a "need to share" era. 
D. CHANGING MENTAL THOUGHT (RESISTANCE TO SHARE 
INFORMATION) 
In an effort to investigate the events leading to the 
attack on the World Trade Center, the 9/11 commission was 
formed.  The commission issued a report stating that 
information sharing was one of the leading causes that lead 
to the inability to stop the attack.  Regardless of the 9/11 
commissions report highlighting serious oversight of sharing 
information many federal agencies still are trying to tackle 
the idea of sharing information between agencies.  
In 2005, GAO placed information sharing on its 
high-risk list of government programs that face 
significant management problems, and it remains 
there today. GAO's latest high-risk report, 
released in January 2009, concluded that while 
agencies are developing an "information sharing 
environment, the scope, projects and milestones -
- the roadmap -- for guiding the future 
[information sharing environment] were not fully 
defined" and, along with OMB, observed that "the 
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expected results and metrics -- the system of 
accountability -- to ensure progress were not in 
place. (Holmes 2009) 
While policy setting improvements helped jump start the 
changing vision of enabling information sharing, policy 
setting alone is not enough to get the point across that 
information sharing is vital to our 21st century success on 
terrorism. The goal is to enable today's decision makers 
with the ability to understand completely the importance of 
changing their mental thought about sharing our vital 
information between agencies.  Policies might be provided, 
but if you do not get the buy in from your stakeholders that 
hold the power to actually deploy the ideas behind the 
policies we will continue to live in an era of stove piped 
systems and just wait for our next attack.  Or, we can take 
our decisions makers by the hand and give them the mental 
tools to envision what could be possible if interagency 
information sharing occurred on a daily basis.  Changing 
mental thought of information sharing will not be easy 
because we have operated for so many years as independent 
entities of the United States government.  Holding onto your 
information gives you and your agency power over others, job 
security, and an intellectual advantage.  These are the type 
of decision makers we do not need working for our federal, 
state and local law enforcement authorities any longer. Our 
adversaries are monitoring our efforts and evolving rapidly 
in their motivations, we must move faster to provide a 
shared vision that will enable information sharing.  The 
figure below is from the United States Intelligence 
community Information Sharing Strategy, which I think,  
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represents where we are and what we need to achieve to 




Figure 8 New Information Sharing Model from United States 
Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy. 
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V. DATA SHARING ENVIROMENT EXPERIMENT IN MIO 08-4 
The Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) 08-4 
experiment, which was conducted in September 8-12, 2008 in 
New York-New Jersey, Ft. Eustis, Sweden, Denmark to evaluate 
and test the use of networks, advanced sensors and 
collaborative data sharing for the rapid MIO. This 
experiment demonstrated the situational awareness focus and 
explored the requirements for interagency collaboration and 
data sharing.  This experiment used the capabilities of 
Ports Authority of New York and New Jersey Joint Situational 
Awareness System (PANYJS JSAS), Microsoft GROOVE and the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) situational tools. 
In the following paragraphs there are portions of the 
TNT MIO 08-4 after action report along with the author’s 
analysis, see (Bordetsky 2008) for the complete report.  
This experiment will demonstrate that a decentralized 
network incorporating several data sources from around the 
world was used in collaboration for detection and 
interdiction.  Agency participates were granted access based 
on their specific need to know criteria.  This was a control 
security measure, which provided protection to certain vital 
information found within JSAS, GROOVE & NPS situational 
tools. However this detention and interdiction does not go 
without errors and highlights areas for improvements in data 
sharing among the interagency command structure.   
On September 8, 2008 interagency partners in Europe 
indicated a possible threat by posting an alert in JSAS that 
a terrorist group had intentions of smuggling improvised 
nuclear device (IND) and radiological dispersion device 
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(RDD) into the United States, which was concealed in the 
cargo within a foreign flagged vessel heading for New 
York/New Jersey.  This indication in JSAS was noticed by all 
local law enforcement agencies such as USCG, CBP, Port 
Authorities, PAPD, FDNY and NYPD prompting a massive 
collaboration effort to detect and interdict the vessel.  
 
 
Figure 9 External view of target vessel (Container Vessel) 
pier side at Newark NJ Pier 17, September 8, 2008 
Law enforcement officials conducted a boarding with 
hand held radiological detention equipment.  During the 
boarding each agency had connectivity with JSAS, GROOVE & 
NPS SA and entered information upon detecting any 
radiological sources. The information was also being sent to 
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the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) for real time 
identification of the radiological material.  The 
connectivity that the boarding teams had with JSAS, GROOVE & 
NPS SA tools facilitated the updating of the command and 
control centers by enabling situational awareness to the 
decision makers.  Also during this boarding the teams were 
collecting a comprehensive crew list, last port of call 
data, biometrics (latent prints/facials) and were seamlessly 
sending real time voice and data through JSAS, GROOVE & NPS 
to all Command and Control Centers through out the world. 
 
Figure 10 Sonar Alert biometrics from Demark seen in JSAS 
Situational Awareness Viewer Display screen 
DNDO successfully retrieved the information that was 
sent by the boarding teams that were posted in JSAS.  DNDO 
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could now make the determination of a positive or negative 
confirmation and post results in JSAS for boarding team to 
take action. 
This experiment represents that interagency data 
sharing is instrumental in detecting and intercepting a 
possible terrorist attack on the United States.  
Interlinking data source that are currently in use have 
strong collaborative capabilities, however, when 
orchestrating such an event there are difficulties in 
establishing one-on-one communication because there were so 
many agencies involved they did not know if the messages 
posted within JSAS were directed to them for 
acknowledgement.  
For example, DNDO received a readable spectrum analysis 
from the JSAS portal.  It was not clear whether DNDO (in 
support of state and local agencies) should process the 
request analysis or LSS (in support of the DHS agencies). 
DNDO requested more information from the reporting agency 
through the JSAS portal because the spectrum information was 
incomplete (background readings, distance, location, etc.) 
There were no responses to messages in the JSAS portal and 
no means to confirm that the correct users ever received the 
request. In the end, the US Coast Guard also collected the 
spectrum from the JSAS portal and coordinated with LSS to 
conduct the analysis and adjudication of the spectrum. DNDO 
only became aware of this manifestation after LSS informed 
DNDO of the results. The DNDO watch officer needs more 
information and has instructed the sender to call him. There 







Figure 11 Streaming video frame (upper left corner) from 
NJSP vessel conducting search for small target vessels 




Figure 12 Small craft interdiction Groove Workspace MIO 07-
04 
 
DNDO DATA SHARING RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
The JSAS portal should have two features added to 
prevent the confusion. The first feature should include 1) a 
requester entry, 2) intended audience and 3) action 
requested. For examples; From PANYNJ to DNDO, Request 
analysis of Spectrum located at. The second feature should 
be 1) a confirmation of acceptance from the intended 
audience and 2) a comment block. For example: DNDO has 
received the information request and cannot accurately 
process until the following information is received. These 
features would allow for positive communication between the 
requester and intended audience, while providing situational 
awareness to all participants. 
The following are the actual logged events that depict 
how information was being exchanged between agencies using 
different collaborative tools.   
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0808: NPS NOC online—Groove Chat 
 
0924: NOC transfers JSAS C2, lost connectivity 
due to weather—Groove Chat 
 
1158: Port Newark patrol underway—Groove Chat 
 
1204: Coast Guard cutter underway—JSAS 
For Official Use Only 33 / 80 
 
1205: New York fire boat underway—Groove Chat 
 
1207: New York fireboat underway—JSAS 
 
1216: New Jersey state police passed the target 
vessel at 100 meters, no source detected—JSAS 
 
1218: New Jersey state police detected source at 
51 feet off target vessel stern—JSAS 
 
1220: Coast Guard cutter detects biometrics 
vessel at 40.42.206-74, .07.061 - JSAS 
 
1222: Coast Guard Cutter makes contact with 
subject vessel—Groove Chat 
 
1222: New Jersey State Police detects vessel to 
align starboard side with the stern of target 
vessel. Detected source at 10 meters—JSAS 
 
1227: New Jersey State Police passed target 
vessel approximately 4 meters at 14 knots. 
Detection level 361 gamma counts.—JSAS 
 
1227: Coast Guard cutter contacts confirmation at 
40.42.206N 074.07.061W at 12:18 ARAM 
Radiation Monitor identified Cesium 137- JSAS 
 
1314: New York fireboat has detected 18 micros 
from target vessel in position 40.41.928N 
074—05.827W - JSAS 
 
1318: New York harbor vessel has target vessel in 
sight—Groove Chat 
 
1318: New York fireboat detects biometrics data 
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indicates high risk individual on target vessel 
Bobby Al-sir-bg, suspect has been detained and 
waiting for instructions - JSAS 
 
1320: New York fireboat approaching target 
vessel—Groove Chat 
 
1320: New York Sate Police gamma event 17 
distance 72\ Speed 5 Knot ID. Cs137 
 
1321: New York fireboat has detected 18 micros 
from target vessel—Groove Chat 
 
1329: Jersey City fireboat Gama Source detection 
lat: 40.42.35N and Long:0.74.07.11W: Two 
mrams by thermo, 38 mrams by identifier, 9.5 
mrams by thermo fisher FH671—Groove Chat 
 
1333: Index all vessels returning to port—Groove 
Chat 
 
1334: UCC reporting index—Groove Chat 
 
1339: Exercise concludes - JSAS 
 
Concluding the experiment there was an informal hot 
wash among all the participants discussing and highlighting 
items they thought were items to be improved in the next 
MIO.  Below are a few issues and recommendations that were 
brought forth by the DNDO. 
 
Issue: no intuitive method to conduct persist 
informal discussions. 
 
Discussion: Many collaborative tools have a chat 
feature that encourages informal, multi-user 
discussions. Chat discussions are where much of 
the information is shared between subject matter 
experts, decision makers, action officers, and 
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first responders. The informal attribute allow 
for intelligent people to ask questions on 
subjects that they are not necessarily experts on 
(no stupid question concept) and get a more than 
one explanation. The consumer can then decide 
when they have enough information and bad 
information can be refuted by the community in 
near real time. This can be equated to the 
“hallway conference” or conversations that occur 
at the “coffee pot or drinking fountain.” For 
instance, Participant 1 reports the location of a 
vehicle at coordinates X, Y. A first responder or 
command center can reply to the thread indicating 
that those coordinates were as of 2 hours ago, 
the new location as of this time are coordinate 
X1, Y1. 
 
Recommendation: Create a persistent discussion 
thread that facilitates the informal discussion 
that can aid in situational awareness. This is 
not intended to replace the formal alerts or 
instant message—point-to-point communications. 
Issue: Key for Alerts is not intuitive 
 
Discussion: The alerts in JSAS have several color 
codes (Green, Yellow, Blue, Orange, and Red) and 
statuses (unknown, none, minor, moderate, severe, 
extreme) that do not map to the actual event 
description. For instance a video feed was 
reported as both Orange/Moderate and Green/None. 
This is just one example of several 
inconsistencies. 
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Recommendation: Have a legend or key on the alert 
section that can be hidden or minimized once it 
is learned. Also, have an active adjudicator who 
can adjust the status of the alert and add a note 
as to why the change occurred. 
 
Issue: Naming convention 
 
Discussion: The naming convention for Alerts and 
Files do not inform the users as to the content 
of the alerts or files. In the alerts, some 
entries were listed as Jersey City Marine 1, but 
the actual message was Thermo Fisher—Identifier—
38 yRem Hr . . . They title did not inform the 
user as to the contents of the message. Also, the 
when files are downloaded, they are given a 
generic name starting with F followed by numbers. 
 
Recommendation: Create and enforce a naming 
convention. Have an active adjudicator who can 
adjust the status of the alert AND add a note as 
to why the change occurred. 
 
Issue: NPS’s Observer Notepad refresh feature 
deletes comments 
 
Discussion: When entering text into the system 
and the system automatically refreshes, all un-




Recommendation: Have the refresh feature only 
update submissions without deleting text that is 
currently in the dialogue box. 
 
Notes: Spectrum received by DNDO watch officer. 
File is readable with the specific software. The 
DNDO watch officer needs more information and has 
instructed the sender to call him. There is no 
confirmation that his request has been received. 
(Bordetsky 2008)  
In the above experiment there were several 
collaborative tools used to identify, detect and intercept 
the target vessel.  The three main collaborative tools were 
JSAS, GROOVE and NPS Situational Awareness (SA) which all 
have their distinct capabilities.  NPS SA is primarily a 
common operating picture (COP) tool, GROOVE is primarily a 
collaborative tool to share thoughts, documents and video 
with other participants while JSAS is a hybrid of both the 
common operating picture and the collaborative tool. These 
tools were used successfully by passing information between 
them using MITRE'S cursor on target (CoT), which is a 
machine-to-machine language designed to communicate quickly 
and accurately.  These collaborative tools all have the 
ability to speak the language of CoT, which allowed the 
interoperability of information to flow between data 
sources.  As noted from the above difficulties sharing 
within JSAS became troublesome on the first day of the 
experiment due to several undefined issues possibly relating 
from user experience and connectivity.  On the second day of 
the experiment the boarding teams focused their efforts on 
sharing data within GROOVE, which proved to be a strong 
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source for collaborative efforts. JSAS is an outstanding 
tool for collaborating however there are issues that may 
relate to the robustness as stated in the above issues.             
The Naval Postgraduate School is continuing the 
experiment with MIO and will be improving on every 
situation, such as the scenario above. This experiment is 
not a substitute for solving the larger problems within DHS 
and around the government, but is an example of what is 
possible of the machine-to-machine language designed of CoT, 
and if further research is conducted the need for 
interoperability will be achieved.  DHS uses a process 
called CAP (Common Alert Protocol), which is an XML-based 
data format for exchanging public warnings.  The 
possibilities of both language designs will future our 
nation in achieving interoperability.  For future research, 
I offer the following hypothesis: If agencies are 
collaborating in a dynamic data-sharing environment, then 
there should be a mechanism to conduct one-on-one side bar 






VI. CONCLUSION  
A. UNITY—SHARING THE SECRET 
The focus of this thesis was to discuss and educate the 
reader with the importance of interoperability between 
agencies and highlight where we are in the process. The 
focus is on how the Department of Homeland Security is 
having difficulties developing an effective solution solving 
the ability to share information horizontally and vertically 
between agencies.  Several other federal, state, and local 
agencies across the entire United States are having the same 
difficulties.  Taxpayers are paying billions of dollars a 
year for the development of software that is not fulfilling 
the needs to share information between agencies.  For 
example, the Department of Homeland Security's HSIN is not 
providing the level of information needed by its users so 
they are redeveloping NextGen HSIN for sixty-two million 
dollars.  Why are they redeveloping a network that does not 
address the users requirements and then name it NextGen 
HSIN?  Maybe this is going to be another sixty-two million-
dollar mistake to the taxpayers.  The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) are agencies that follow, evaluate and provide 
oversight of acquisition development throughout the 
government. You can "Google" these reports and many of them 
are very detailed and provide strong suggestions on how to 
proceed in indentifying ways to fix shortcomings.  However 
many of these reports fall on deaf ears and problems that 
could have been resolved proceed with development while 
costing the taxpayer billions that could have been avoided 
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if only someone was listening.  Agencies that are developing 
substandard software are not being held accountable for 
wasting taxpayer’s monies and most importantly the safety of 
the United States for not enabling a fully functional 
information-sharing framework. 
The information sharing networks that are being 
developed throughout the federal, state, and local 
government focus on compartmentalization of information such 
as Department of Homeland Security's HSIN where Community of 
Interest are the key ways to share information with other 
agencies with the same law enforcement mission.  However, 
there could be vital information in another COI but someone 
has to ask for that information.  No one will ask for the 
information because they do not even know that information 
exists, or someone asks but the information cannot be shared 
because of the current rules protecting information. What 
this represents is that we are still operating in a "need to 
know" era before we can share. 
With the current rules governing over sharing 
information, agencies still encourage over classification of 
material and compartmentalization of information between 
agencies.  We are still rewarding the ability to protect 
information instead of trying to share.  We are continuing 
to follow our past of a "need to know" and not really 
grasping the concept of the "need to share" mental thought.  
We have the technological advances to enable agencies to 
develop suitable information sharing platforms.  Even though 
we have policies helping to jump-start and streamline the 
idea of sharing information to protect and defend our 
nation, we still do not have strong rules for acquiring, 
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accessing and sharing and using vast stores of public and 
private data that may be available. (The 9-11 Commission 
Final Report) Without the rules and laws that will protect 
the ability to share information, agencies will continue to 
protect their information because there is no repercussion 
for protecting. 
Any software that is being developed must take the 
stakeholder requirements to heart when in development.  
Requirements are the basis for identifying what is really 
needed by stakeholders to enable a network to be successful.  
This is one of the most common mistakes when in development, 
not getting quality requirements from your user. 
The overall success of developing a successful 
interagency information-sharing framework is important in 
numerous areas of protecting and defending our nation.  In 
this thesis, the author endeavored to tie together 
information sharing and Maritime Port Security and how the 
two interrelate.  The Maritime Ports of the United States 
are vulnerable to attack and sharing information throughout 
the federal, state and local government will increase our 
chances for detecting a possible attack and defeating our 
adversaries in protecting our nation.  Maritime Port 
Security is just one area that will benefit from working 
together and sharing information.  Law enforcement across 
the spectrum will capitalize on the investment to share 
information. 
In conclusions and suggestions to further develop 
information sharing and protecting our nation the following 
is proposed: 
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1. Provide rules and polices needed to foster and 
reward sharing of information.   
2. Provide decision makers with knowledge that will 
change mental thought and promote sharing among 
between agencies. 
3. Before developing a software project fully 
understand the requirements and quality attributes 
from your stakeholders.  Once you have them they 
need to be implemented in an incremental fashion 
during development. 
4. Implement a decentralized network model: this is 
where agencies still have their own databases, but 
these databases could be searched by other agencies 
through designed agency lines.  Information is 
protected through "setting privileges" approach that 
will control access to data by not allowing full 
access to the entire network.  This replaces the 
current structure of a hub and spoke idea where all 
data is located in one central location, which 
contributes to a single point of failure. (Markle 
Foundation 2003) 
To be successful in implementing the above-proposed 
suggestions in strengthening our nation the government 
requires strong leadership.  There are a series of issues 
that need to be address before we are able to share 
information seamlessly across the federal government.  I 
believe it starts with the commander in chief to enhance 
incentives to share information.  People in general need 
some sort of incentive to come to a realization that 
interoperability is a vital concept that needs to be 
 61
implemented.  Without incentives its still easier and safer 
to safe guard your information. "Why go out of my way and 
share if nothing is in it for me?" some people may ask 
themselves. 
I also believe there is a classification issue that 
still exists between agencies.  DHS encompasses many 
agencies and there are still trust issues.  Just because DHS 
now encompasses several disparate agencies does not 
eliminate the trust element among agencies. 
You can have all the facts and figures, all the 
supporting evidence, all the endorsement that you 
want, but if you don't command trust, you won't 
get anywhere. Nail Fitzgerald (Covey 2006) 
Technique and technology are important, but 
adding trust is the issue of the decade. Tom 
Peters (Covey 2006) 
When you connect database through middleware there has 
to be permissions granted by some authority.  As mentioned 
above the concept of a decentralized network is the key 
concept to connecting existing databases.  However, I would 
recommend that a centralized access list be maintained by 
DHS to grant permissions on viewing/access capabilities.  
This allows one hierarchical entity to oversee who is on the 
network and monitor the areas that need to be highly 











Figure 13 A Coast Guard RHIB off Manhattan on the morning of 
11 September 2001 by Chan Irwin. 
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APPENDIX: SUPPORTING INTEROPERABILITY  
A. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER 13356 
“By the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and 
in order to further strengthen the effective conduct of 
United States intelligence activities and protect the 
territory, people, and interests of the United States of 
America, including against terrorist attacks, it is hereby 
ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Policy. To the maximum extent consistent 
with applicable law, agencies shall, in the design and use 
of information systems and in the dissemination of 
information among agencies: 
(a) Give the highest priority to (i) the detection, 
prevention, disruption, preemption, and mitigation of the 
effects of terrorist activities against the territory, 
people, and interests of the United States of America, (ii) 
the interchange of terrorism information among agencies, 
(iii) the interchange of terrorism information between 
agencies and appropriate authorities of States and local 
governments, and (iv) the protection of the ability of 
agencies to acquire additional such information; and 
(b) Protect the freedom, information privacy, and other 
legal rights of Americans in the conduct of activities.” 
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